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Abstract—The Chord distributed hash table (DHT) is well-
known and frequently used to implement peer-to-peer systems.
Chord peers find other peers, and access their data, through a
ring-shaped pointer structure in a large identifier space. Despite
claims of proven correctness, i.e., eventual reachability, previous
work has shown that the Chord ring-maintenance protocol is
not correct under its original operating assumptions. It has not,
however, discovered whether Chord could be made correct with
reasonable operating assumptions. The contribution of this paper
is to provide the first specification of correct operations and
initialization for Chord, an inductive invariant that is necessary
and sufficient to support a proof of correctness, and the proof
itself. Most of the proof is carried out by automated analysis of
an Alloy model. The inductive invariant reflects the fact that a
Chord network must have a minimum ring size (the minimum
being the length of successor lists plus one) to be correct. The
invariant relies on an assumption that there is a stable base, of
the minimum size, of permanent ring members. Because a stable
base has only a few members and a Chord network can have
millions, we learn that the obstacles to provable correctness are
anomalies in small networks, and that a stable base need not be
maintained once a Chord network grows large.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer systems are distributed systems featuring de-
centralized control, self-organization of similar nodes, and
scalability. A distributed hash table (DHT) is a peer-to-peer
system that implements a persistent key-value store. It can be
used for shared file storage, group directories, and many other
purposes.
The distributed hash table Chord was first presented in a
2001 SIGCOMM paper [1]. This paper was the fourth-most-
cited paper in computer science for several years (according to
Citeseer), and won the 2011 SIGCOMM Test-of-Time Award.
The nodes of a Chord network have identifiers in an m-
bit identifier space, and reach each other through pointers in
this identifier space. Because the pointer structure is based on
adjacency in the identifier space, and 2m− 1 is adjacent to 0,
the structure of a Chord network is a ring.
The ring structure is disrupted when nodes join, leave,
or fail. The original Chord papers [1], [2] specify a ring-
maintenance protocol whose minimum correctness property is
eventual reachability: given ample time and no further disrup-
tions, the ring-maintenance protocol can repair all disruptions
in the ring structure. If the protocol is not correct in this sense,
then some nodes of a Chord network will become permanently
unreachable from other nodes.
The introductions of the original Chord papers say, “Three
features that distinguish Chord from many other peer-to-peer
lookup protocols are its simplicity, provable correctness, and
provable performance.” An accompanying PODC paper [3]
lists invariants of the ring-maintenance protocol.
The claims of simplicity and performance are certainly true.
The Chord algorithms are far simpler and more completely
specified than those of other DHTs, such as Pastry [4],
Tapestry [5], CAN [6], and Kademlia [7]. There is no attempt
to specify synchronization or timing constraints on distributed
nodes. There are no atomic operations involving multiple
nodes.
The ease of implementing Chord is probably the reason
for its popularity as a component of peer-to-peer systems. Its
fundamental simplicity is probably the reason for its popularity
as a basis for building DHTs with stronger guarantees and
additional capabilities, such as protection against malicious
peers [8], [9], [10], key consistency and data consistency [11],
range queries [12], and atomic access to replicated data [13],
[14].
Unfortunately, the claim of correctness is not true. The
original specification with its original operating assumptions
does not have eventual reachability, and not one of the seven
properties claimed to be invariants in [3] is actually an
invariant [15]. This was revealed by modeling the protocol
in the Alloy language and checking its properties with the
Alloy Analyzer [16], an exercise that illustrates rather clearly
the importance of formal modeling of protocols.
The principal contribution of this paper is to provide the
first specification of a version of Chord that is correct under
reasonable operating assumptions. It corrects all the flaws
that were revealed in [15], as well as some new ones. In
addition, the paper provides a concise, necessary, and sufficient
inductive invariant. It also provides the proof of correctness.
It has been said, of the flaws in original Chord, that they
are either obvious and fixed by all implementers, or extremely
unlikely to cause trouble during Chord execution. Taking this
comment into account, the results in this paper are significant
in the following ways:
(1) Many people implement Chord, or use Chord as a
component of their distributed systems. At least some of
them do not discover the flaws in original Chord e.g., [17].
Implementers should have a correct version of Chord to use,
and they should not have to discover it for themselves. They
should also know the invariant for Chord, as dynamic checking
of the invariant is a design principle for enhancing DHT
security [18].
(2) There is no way to know that the scenarios of subtle
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bugs are truly improbable, for all implementations. To estimate
the probabilities, it would be necessary to make a number of
assumptions about implementation-specific attributes such as
timing.
(3) Many people build on Chord, and reason about Chord
behavior, for the purposes of their research. This reasoning
should have a sound foundation. For example, the performance
analysis in [19] makes incorrect assumptions about Chord
behavior [15]. The research on augmenting and strengthening
Chord, as referenced above, relies on informal descriptions
of Chord and informal reasoning about its behavior. As
automated proof checking increasingly becomes the norm in
distributed systems, attempts to prove properties of systems
based on original Chord will fail or yield unsound results.
Most automated reasoning is absolute rather than probabilistic,
so even improbable bugs would make it unsound.
(4) As will be explained in Section V, efforts to find the
best version of Chord and the best invariant for a proof have
led to interesting insights into how Chord works. People who
build on Chord should be aware of these properties so as to
preserve them and to benefit from them. In one example given
in Section VI, the proof shows that Chord can be implemented
more efficiently than was originally believed. Some principles
may be applicable to all systems that use ring-shaped pointer
structures in large identifier spaces (e.g., [20], [6]).
The paper begins with an overview of Chord using the
revised, correct ring-maintenance operations (Section II), and
a new specification of these operations (Section III). Although
the specification is pseudocode for immediate accessibility, it
is a paraphrase of a formal specification in Alloy. The complete
Alloy model, including specification, invariant, and all steps
of the proof, can be found at http://www2.research.att.com/
∼pamela/chord.html. In addition, Section IV provides a brief
summary of differences between the original and correct Chord
operations, and why the differences matter.
Correct operations are necessary but not sufficient. It is also
necessary to have an inductive invariant to use in constructing
a proof, and to initialize a network in a state that satisfies the
invariant. Original Chord is initialized with a network of one
node, which is not correct, and Section V shows why. Chord
must be initialized with a ring containing a minimum of r+1
nodes, where r is the length of each node’s list of successors.
In fact, to be proven correct, a Chord network must maintain
a “stable base” of r + 1 nodes that remain members of the
network throughout its lifetime. Section V shows that a stable
base enforces a concise invariant that implies other necessary
structural properties. The section also explains that, while a
stable base is necessary for provable correctness, the anomalies
it is preventing can only occur in small rings. Thus, when the
ring is large, a stable base need not be maintained.
The proof in Section VII has both manual and automated
parts. The automated parts establish the invariant and guar-
antee that, if the state of the network is non-ideal, some
repair operation is enabled that will change the network state.
The manual part defines a measure, which is a non-negative
integer, of the error in a non-ideal network. It also shows that
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Fig. 1. Ideal (left) and valid (right) networks. Members are represented by
their identifiers. Solid arrows are successor pointers.
every state change due to a repair operation reduces the error.
Together these parts show that if all enabled operations occur
eventually, then repair operations will eventually reduce the
error to zero, at which time the network state will be ideal.
The conclusion (Section VII) includes recommendations for
implementers and future work.
Together Sections IV and V present most of the problems
with original Chord reported in [15] (as well as previously
unreported ones). The problems are not presented first because
they make more sense when explained along with their under-
lying nature and how to remove them.
Although other researchers have found problems with Chord
implementations [21], [22], [23], they have not discovered
any problems with the specification of Chord. Other work on
verifiable ring maintenance operations [24] uses multi-node
atomic operations, which are avoided by Chord.
II. OVERVIEW OF CORRECT CHORD
Every member of a Chord network has an identifier (as-
sumed unique) that is an m-bit hash of its IP address. Every
member has a successor list of pointers to other members. The
first element of this list is the successor, and is always shown
as a solid arrow in the figures. Figure 1 shows two Chord
networks with m = 6, one in the ideal state of a ring ordered
by identifiers, and the other in the valid state of an ordered
ring with appendages. In the networks of Figure 1, key-value
pairs with keys from 31 through 37 are stored in member 37.
While running the ring-maintenance protocol, a member also
acquires and updates a predecessor pointer, which is always
shown as a dotted arrow in the figures.
The ring-maintenance protocol is specified in terms of
three operations, each of which changes the state of at most
one member. In executing an operation, the member queries
another member or sequence of members, then updates its
own pointers if necessary. The specification of Chord assumes
that inter-node communication is bidirectional and reliable, so
we are not concerned with Chord behavior when inter-node
communication fails.
A node becomes a member in a join operation. A member
node is also referred to as live. When a member joins, it
contacts an existing member and gets its own current successor
from that member. (It also contacts the current successor to
get a full successor list.) The first stage of Figure 2 shows
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Fig. 2. A new node becomes part of the ring. A gray circle marks the pointer updated by an operation, if any. Dotted arrows are predecessors.
successor and predecessor pointers in a section of a network
where 10 has just joined.
When a member stabilizes, it learns its successor’s prede-
cessor. It adopts the predecessor as its new successor, provided
that the predecessor is closer in identifier order than its current
successor. Because a member must query its successor to sta-
bilize, this is also an opportunity for it to update its successor
list with information from the successor. Members schedule
their own stabilize operations, which should be periodic.
Between the first and second stages of Figure 2, 10 stabi-
lizes. Because its successor’s predecessor is 7, which is not a
better successor for 10 than its current 19, this operation does
not change the successor of 10.
After stabilizing (regardless of the result), a node notifies
its successor of its identity. This causes the notified member
to execute a rectify operation. The rectifying member checks
whether its current predecessor is still a member, and then
adopts the notifying member as its new predecessor if the
notifying member is closer in identifier order than its current
predecessor (or if it has no live predecessor). In the third stage
of Figure 2, 10 has notified 19, and 19 has adopted 10 as its
new predecessor.
In the fourth stage of Figure 2, 7 stabilizes, which causes
it to adopt 10 as its new successor. In the last stage 7 notifies
and 10 rectifies, so the predecessor of 10 becomes 7. Now the
new member 10 is completely incorporated into the ring, and
all the pointers shown are correct.
One operating assumption of the protocol is that a member
in good standing always responds to queries in a timely
fashion. A node ceases to become a member in a fail event,
which can represent failure of the machine, or the node’s
silently leaving the network. A member that has failed is also
referred to as dead. Another operating assumption is that, after
a member fails, it no longer responds to queries from other
members. With these assumptions, members can detect the
failure of other members perfectly by noticing whether they
respond to a query before a timeout occurs. A third assumption
about failure behavior is that successor lists are long enough,
and failures are infrequent enough, to ensure that a member
is never left with no live successor in its list.
Failures can produce gaps in the ring, which are repaired
during stabilization. As a member attempts to query its succes-
sor for stabilization, it may find that its successor is dead. In
this case it attempts to query the next member in its successor
list and make this its new successor, continuing through the
list until it finds a live successor.
As in the original Chord papers [1], [2], we wish to define a
correctness property of eventual reachability: given ample time
and no further disruptions, the ring-maintenance protocol can
repair disruptions so that every member of a Chord network is
reachable from every other member. Note that a network with
appendages (nodes 50, 53, 63, 9 on the right side of Figure 1)
cannot have full reachability, because an appendage cannot be
reached by a member that is not an appendage.
A network is ideal when each pointer is globally correct.
For example, on the right of Figure 1, the globally correct
successor of 48 is 50 because it is the nearest member
in identifier order. Because the ring-maintenance protocol is
supposed to repair all imperfections, and because it is given
ample time to do all the repairs, the correctness criterion can
be strengthened slightly, to: In any execution state, if there are
no subsequent join or fail events, then eventually the network
will become ideal and remain ideal.
Defining a member’s best successor as its first successor
pointing to a live node (member), a ring member is a member
that can reach itself by following the chain of best successors.
An appendage member is a member that is not a ring member.
Of the seven invariants presented in [3] (and all violated
by original Chord), the following four are necessary for
correctness.
• There must be a ring, which means that there must be a
non-empty set of ring members (AtLeastOneRing).
• There must be no more than one ring, which means
that from each ring member, every other ring member
is reachable by following the chain of best successors
(AtMostOneRing).
• On the unique ring, the nodes must be in identifier order
(OrderedRing).
• From each appendage member, the ring must be reachable
by following the chain of best successors (ConnectedAp-
pendages).
If any of these rules is violated, there is a disruption in the
structure that the ring-maintenance protocol cannot repair, and
some members will be permanently unreachable from some
other members. It follows that any inductive invariant for
Chord must include these as conjuncts.
The Chord papers define the lookup protocol, which is not
discussed here. They also define the maintenance and use
of finger tables, which improve lookup speed by providing
pointers that cross the ring like chords of a circle. Because
finger tables are an optimization and they are built from
successors and predecessors, correctness does not depend on
them.
III. SPECIFICATION OF RING-MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
This section contains pseudocode, derived from the Alloy
model, for the join, stabilize, and rectify operations.
There is a type Identifier which is a string of m bits.
Implicitly, whenever a member transmits the identifier of a
member, it also transmits its IP address so that the recipient can
reach the identified member. The pair is self-authenticating, as
the identifier must be the hash of the IP address according to
a chosen function.
The Boolean function between is used to check the order
of identifiers. Because identifier order wraps around at zero, it
is meaningless to compare two identifiers—each precedes and
succeeds the other. This is why between has three arguments:
Boolean function between (n1,n2,n3: Identifier)
{ if (n1 < n3) return ( n1 < n2 && n2 < n3 )
else return ( n1 < n2 || n2 < n3 )
}
It is important to note that, for all distinct x and y,
between(x,y,x) is always true, and between(x,x,y) and
between(y,x,x) are always false.
The function
Identifier function lookupSucc
(joining: Identifier) { }
takes the identifier of a joining node, and uses the lookup
protocol to return the identifier of its proper succes-
sor in the ring. In other words, for two members n
and lookupSucc(joining) that are adjacent in the ring,
between(n,joining,lookupSucc(joining)).
Each node has the following variables:
myIdent: Identifier;
known: Identifier;
pred: Identifier U Null;
succList: list Identifier; // length is r
where myIdent is the hash of its IP address, known is a
member of the Chord network known to the node when it
joins, and pred is the node’s predecessor. For convenience in
the pseudocode, we allow the type Identifier to include
the constant Null, meaning that there is no predecessor.
succList is its entire successor list; the head of this list is
its first successor or simply its successor. The parameter r is
the fixed length of all successor lists.
To join, a node executes the following pseudocode.
// Join operation
newSucc: Identifier;
query known for lookupSucc(myIdent);
if (query returns before timeout) {
newSucc = lookupSucc(myIdent);
query newSucc for newSucc.succList;
if (query returns before timeout) {
succList =
append(newSucc,
butLast(newSucc.succList));
pred = Null;
}
else retry Join later;
}
else retry Join later;
First, the node asks the known node to look up the node’s
identifier and get its proper successor, storing the value in
newSucc. The node then queries newSucc for its successor
list. Finally the node constructs its own successor list by
concatenating newSucc and newSucc’s successor list, with
the last element of the list trimmed off to produce a result
of length r. If either of the queries fail the node has no choice
but to retry again later.
To stabilize, a node executes the following pseudocode.
// Stabilize operation
newSucc: Identifier;
while (succList is not empty) {
query head(succList) for
head(succList).pred and
head(succList).succList;
if (query returns before timeout) {
newSucc = head(succList).pred;
succList =
append(
head(succList),
butLast(head(succList).succList)
);
if
(between(myIdent,newSucc,head(succList))
{ query newSucc for newSucc.succList;
if (query returns before timeout)
succList =
append(
newSucc,
butLast(newSucc.succList)
);
};
notify head(succList) of myIdent;
break;
}
else succList = tail(succList);
};
In the outer loop of this code, the node queries its successor
for its successor’s predecessor and successor list. If this query
times out, then the node’s successor is presumed dead. The
node promotes its second successor to first and tries again.
Once it has contacted a live successor, it executes inner code
ending in a break out of the loop. The loop is guaranteed to
terminate before succList is empty, based on the assumption
that successor lists are long enough so that each list contains
at least one live node.
Once it has contacted a live successor, the node first updates
its successor list with its successor’s list. It then checks to see
if the new pointer it has learned, its successor’s predecessor, is
an improved successor. If so, and if newSucc is live, it adopts
newSucc as its new successor. Thus the stabilize operation
requires one or two queries for each traversal of the outer
loop. Whether or not there is a live improved successor, the
node notifies its successor of its own identity.
A node rectifies when it is notified, thereafter executing the
following pseudocode:
// Rectify operation
newPred: Identifier;
receive notification of newPred;
if (pred = Null) pred = newPred;
else {
query pred to see if live;
if (query returns before timeout) {
if (between(pred,newPred,myIdent))
pred = newPred;
}
else pred = newPred;
};
When a node fails or leaves, it ceases to stabilize, notify,
or respond to queries from other nodes. When a node rejoins,
it re-initializes its Chord variables.
IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VERSIONS
The join, stabilize, and notified operations of the original
protocol are defined as pseudocode in [1] and [2]. These
papers do not provide details about failure recovery. The only
published paper with pseudocode for failure recovery is [3],
where failure recovery is performed by the reconcile, update,
and flush operations. The following table shows how events
of the two versions correspond. Although rectify in the new
version is similar to notified in the old version, it seems more
consistent to use an active verb form for its name.
old new
join + join
reconcile
stabilize + stabilize
reconcile +
update
notified + rectify
flush
In both old and new versions of Chord, members schedule
their own maintenance operations except for notified and rec-
tify, which occur when a member is notified by its predecessor.
Although the operations are loosely expected to be periodic,
scheduling is not formally constrained. As can be seen from
the table, multiple smaller operations from the old version are
assembled into larger new operations. This ensures that the
successor lists of members are always fully populated with
r entries, rather than having missing entries to be filled in
by later operations. An incompletely populated successor list
might lose (to failure) its last live successor. If the successor
list belongs to an appendage member, this would mean that the
appendage can no longer reach the ring, which is a violation
of ConnectedAppendages [15].
Another systematic change from the old version to the new
is that, before incorporating a pointer to a node into its state,
a member checks that it is live. This prevents cases where a
member replaces a pointer to a live node with a pointer to a
dead one. A bad replacement can also cause a successor list to
have no live successor. If the successor list belongs to a ring
member, this will cause a break in the ring, and a violation of
AtLeastOneRing. Together these two systematic changes also
prevent scenarios in which the ring becomes disordered or
breaks into two rings of equal size (violating OrderedRing or
AtMostOneRing, respectively [15]).
A third systematic change is that the new code is much
more complete and explicit than the original pseudocode,
particularly with respect to communication between nodes.
This is important because a Chord operation at a single node
can entail multiple queries to other nodes. Thus the operation
has multiple phases that can be interleaved with operations at
other nodes, and the proof of correctness must consider these
interleavings.
In addition to these systematic changes, a few other small
problems were detected by Alloy modeling and analysis, and
fixed.
V. THE INDUCTIVE INVARIANT
An inductive invariant is an invariant with the property
that if the system satisfies the invariant before any action or
event, then the system can be proved to satisfy the invariant
after the action or event. By induction, if the system’s initial
state satisfies the invariant, then all system states satisfy the
invariant. Typically an inductive invariant is a conjunction of
non-inductive invariants, each of which is not strong enough
by itself to be inductive.
Correct operations for Chord are necessary but not suffi-
cient. We also need an inductive invariant to use in construct-
ing a proof, and the network must be initialized to a state that
satisfies the invariant.
This section will describe concepts in terms of a node’s
extended successor list, which is simply its successor list with
the node identifier in front. So node n’s extended successor
list, of size r + 1, is append(n, n.succList). Conjuncts
of the inductive invariant are all defined formally in Alloy, and
will be presented as informal paraphrases here.
A. Minimum size
Of the four conjuncts defined in Section II, three of
them constrain the network to have a single ordered ring
(AtLeastOneRing, AtMostOneRing, and OrderedRing), while
ConnectedAppendages constrains the appendage members to
be able to reach the ring. All are necessary in the invariant,
but even together are not sufficient.
As stated previously, a node’s successor list must have
r entries because this is necessary to guarantee, under the
protocol’s operating assumptions, that the node will always
have a live successor. For the same reason, each extended
successor list must have r + 1 distinct entries.
Original Chord initializes a network with a single member
that is its own successor, i.e., the initial network is a ring of
size 1. This is not correct, as shown in Figure 3 with r = 2.
Appendage nodes 62 and 37 start with both list entries equal to
48. Then 48 fails, leaving members 62 and 37 with insufficient
48
stabilizes,
62
rectifies
48
fails
37
48
62 37
48
62
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62
Fig. 3. Why the ring cannot be initialized at size 1. Dashed arrows are second-successor pointers. Predecessor pointers are not shown in the last two stages,
as they are irrelevant. This problem was not reported in [15].
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Fig. 4. A counterexample to a trial invariant. Only the relevant pointers are drawn.
information to find each other. For members to be able to have
r+1 distinct entries in ideal extended successor lists, a Chord
network must be initialized and maintained with a minimum
ring size of r + 1.
It seems that we need a conjunct NoDuplicates stating that a
node’s extended successor list has no duplicated entries. This
implies a minimum ring size, but it is impossible to enforce
with normal Chord operations. Chord operations are local, and
a member does not know how many other members or ring
members there are. We will return to this issue in the next
section.
B. Preventing disorder
Because a node’s successor list is ideally intended to
replicate and/or become the ring structure, it seems wise to
have a conjunct OrderedSuccessorLists saying that for all
contiguous sublists (x, y, z) of a node’s extended successor
list, between(x, y, z) holds.
Unfortunately the four original conjuncts and the two new
conjuncts NoDuplicates and OrderedSuccessorLists are still
not sufficient to provide an inductive invariant. To give one
of a multitude of counterexamples, consider Figure 4, which
is another example with r = 2. The first stage satisfies the
trial invariant, having duplicate-free and ordered extended
successor lists such as (52, 3, 45) and (45, 20, 31). The
appendage node 45 does not merge into the ring at the correct
place, but that is part of normal Chord operation (see [15]).
The second successor of ring node 52 points outside the ring,
but that is also part of Chord operation (see Appendix A). Once
3 fails and 52 stabilizes, however, the ring becomes disordered.
There is a stronger invariant that allows Chord to be proved
correct. It relies on an operating assumption that a Chord
network is initialized with a set of members containing a stable
base of at least r + 1 members. The typical range for r is 3-
5, so the typical stable base would require 4 to 6 members.
These members are “stable” in the sense that they continue to
be members throughout the life of the network, without ever
leaving or failing and rejoining. Because a member’s identifier
is derived from its IP address, this means that there is always
a live IP host at that address, with a copy of the member state
for that identifier.
The remainder of this section will explain the invariant
supported by the assumption of a stable base, and how it
provides the structure needed to prove that Chord is correct.
Section VI discusses the stable base further, answering the two
key questions of what it means for implementers and why it
is a necessary assumption to prove correctness.
The final inductive invariant is the conjunction of At-
LeastOneRing, AtMostOneRing, OrderedRing, ConnectedAp-
pendages, and BaseNotSkipped. To explain BaseNotSkipped,
we say that a member n skips a member n2 if there is an
adjacent pair (n1, n3) in the extended successor list of n,
and between(n1, n2, n3) (which implies that neither n1
nor n3 is n2). A member n typically skips n2 if n2 became a
member recently, so that knowledge of it has not yet reached
n. BaseNotSkipped says that no member of a Chord network
skips a member of the stable base. BaseNotSkipped excludes
the first stage of Figure 4, because 52 skips 20 and 31. Of the
four ring members 3, 20, 31, and 52, at least three must be in
the stable base, so 52 cannot skip two of them and still satisfy
the invariant.
We can reason directly about how BaseNotSkipped pre-
vents counterexamples such as the one in Figure 4.
A counterexample network has two extended successor
lists (x, failing nodes, y, . . . ) and (y, . . . z,
at least one node) where between(x, z, y). When the
failing nodes fail and x stabilizes, the extended successor
list of x becomes (x, y, . . . z, . . .) which “wraps
around” the ring if it is interpreted as a clockwise path—once
the path has reached z, it has passed its origin x.
Can this counterexample be constructed and still satisfy
BaseNotSkipped? The trick is to fit the r + 1 base nodes into
the extended successor lists. x and y can be base nodes but z
cannot, because it would be skipped by the extended successor
list of x. To satisfy BaseNotSkipped, the remaining r− 1 base
nodes must fit into the ellipsis between y and z in the extended
successor list of y. This is not possible, however, because the
length of the extended successor list is r+1, so the maximum
length of the ellipsis is r − 2.
This argument demonstrates how BaseNotSkipped serves to
fill out successor lists so that they do not span too big an
arc of the ring. It is easy to see that BaseNotSkipped implies
NoDuplicates. If an extended successor list mentions node n
twice, then even if n is a base node, the other r base nodes
must fit in the space between the two mentions, or otherwise
they would be skipped. Yet the maximum size of the space is
r − 1.
Although it is a little harder to see, BaseNotSkipped also
implies OrderedSuccessorLists. Here is an informal proof by
contradiction:
Contrary to the hypothesis, assume there is an extended suc-
cessor list of the form ( . . . x, z, y, . . . ) where
between(x, z, y) is false. This means that a clockwise
path around the ring from x would go through y, then z, then
come to x again.
Since the extended successor list must satisfy BaseNot-
Skipped, we can ask where the base nodes are in the ring.
• There cannot be base nodes in the arc of the ring between
x and z, which includes y, because the pair (x, z) would
skip them.
• There cannot be base nodes in the arc of the ring between
z and y, which includes x, because the pair (z, y) would
skip them.
Thus the arcs where base nodes are prohibited cover the entire
ring except z. A stable base always has more than one member,
so there is a contradiction.
It has now been shown that adding BaseNotSkipped to the
four original conjuncts prevents duplicates in successor lists
and guarantees ordered successor lists. Thus BaseNotSkipped
is a powerful and surprisingly compact representation of the
structure of a correct Chord network.
VI. DISCUSSION OF THE STABLE BASE
A. What does a stable base mean for implementers?
There is something rather odd about the assumption of a
stable base: a stable base has few nodes and a Chord network
can have millions. Furthermore, there is no requirement on
how members of the stable base are distributed around the
ring. This means that there are arbitrarily large sections of the
ring that are not close to any member of the stable base, and
whose operations have nothing to do with the stable base. So
how is the stable base maintaining their correctness?
The solution to this puzzle is obvious in retrospect. Once
the operations are made correct as described in Sections III
and IV, all the remaining correctness problems arise from
anomalies in small rings: they fall below minimum size, their
successor lists “wrap around” the ring, etc. Once the ring has
grown large, it is not in danger of any such anomalies, and
the stable base is not needed.
This is good news for implementers. For a correct imple-
mentation of Chord, it is necessary to initialize it with r + 1
members, and to preserve a stable base until the network
grows to a safe size (perhaps three times the size of the stable
base). After that, provided that the network does not shrink
drastically, the stable-base assumption can be ignored.
There is an additional bonus for implementers. Consider
what happens when a member node fails, recovers, and wishes
to rejoin, all of which could occur within a short period of
time. It was previously thought necessary for the node to wait
until all previous references to its identifier had probably been
cleared away, because obsolete pointers could be incorrect in
the current state. This wait was included in the first Chord
implementation [25]. Yet the stable base makes the wait
unnecessary, as Chord is provably correct even with obsolete
pointers.
In the spirit of [18], it is a good security practice to
monitor that invariants are satisfied. All of the conjuncts of
the inductive invariant are global, and thus unsuitable for local
monitoring. The right properties to monitor are NoDuplicates
and OrderedSuccessorLists, which can be checked on indi-
vidual successor lists. These are the properties that must be
invariant in Chord networks of any size.
B. Is a stable base necessary to prove correctness?
There is strong evidence that BaseNotSkipped is a necessary
conjunct in the inductive invariant of Chord. We have seen
that it implies other necessary properties. Most importantly,
it guarantees that the network maintains its minimum size,
which would not otherwise be possible without additional
coordination mechanisms.
The final argument is that there was an enormously long and
ultimately fruitless search for another invariant. An inductive
invariant is a concise characterization of all the states that a
system can reach during operation, even if it is operating for
a long time. To prove that it is an inductive invariant, we must
show that every system operation preserves it. Consequently,
there are two requirements for an inductive invariant: (1) it
must be strong enough so that every operation has a well-
structured state to work on; (2) it must be weak enough so
that the result of every operation still satisfies it. Unfortunately
these two requirements conflict, making inductive invariants
notoriously difficult to find.
For those who would like a taste of the search process,
Appendix A examines two of the most promising candidate
conjuncts, and shows why they failed to become part of the
final invariant.
VII. PROOF OF CORRECTNESS
This section presents the proof of the theorem given in
Section II:
Theorem: In any execution state, if there are no subsequent
join or fail events, then eventually the network will become
ideal and remain ideal.
As has been mentioned, the formal specification of correct
Chord is written in Alloy. The Alloy language combines first-
order predicate logic, relational algebra, and transitive closure.
The Alloy Analyzer verifies properties by means of exhaustive
enumeration of instances over a bounded domain. This push-
button analysis either yields a counterexample, or proves that
the property holds in the bounded domain. The proof here
is a hybrid, including both lemmas proved automatically by
the Alloy Analyzer and lemmas proved manually. The reasons
for using Alloy in this work, as well as its limitations, are
discussed in [26].
A. Modeling concurrency
The formal model uses shared memory communication
between nodes to simulate queries. An event is an atomic
operation, executed by a single node and altering only its own
state, that may use the result of a single query. Concurrency
has interleaving semantics. Thus the interleaved events model
local computations performed by nodes between or after
queries.
In the model, fail and rectify operations are independent
events. Joins correspond to two events at the same node:
1) The node queries a known member for its current
successor and executes an event of type JoinLookup
if it gets one.
2) The node queries its current successor for a successor
list and executes an event of type Join if it gets one.
A stabilize operation corresponds to one or two events at the
same node:
1) The node queries its first successor for a predeces-
sor and successor list, and executes an event of type
StabilizeFromOldSuccessor if it gets them.
2) Otherwise the node queries subsequent successors
in its list as above, until it succeeds in querying
a live successor and executing an event of type
StabilizeFromOldSuccessor.
3) If the acquired predecessor appears to be a
better first successor, the node queries it for
its successor list and executes an event of type
StabilizeFromNewSuccessor if it gets the list.
As the event types are modeled in the form of logical
constraints, it is necessary to use Alloy analysis to check
that the constraints are consistent, i.e., that events of the
types can exist or occur. This has been done, as is shown in
full at http://www2.research.att.com/∼pamela/chord.html. All
other proof steps are also included.
A JoinLookup event establishes a precondition for its sub-
sequent Join event. How can we be sure that the precondition
still holds when the Join event occurs, knowing that other
events can occur between this event pair? The precondition is
no b: Network.base | Between[ n, b, j.newSucc ]
where no is a quantifier meaning ¬∃, Network.base is the
set of members of the stable base, j is the actual event of
type Join (an Alloy object), n is the node executing j, and
j.newSucc is the new successor of n. The precondition says
that no member of the stable base lies between n and its
new successor in identifier order. No term of this condition
is mutable or time-dependent, so interleaved events cannot
falsify it. Here is a place where the assumption of a stable
base plays a direct role in the proof.
B. Establishing the invariant
The next step of the proof is to establish the inductive
invariant, named Valid in the model, by proving that it is
preserved by events of every type. For each event type such
as Fail, there is a lemma such as FailPreservesValidity,
which says that if the network state is valid immediately before
a fail event, then it is valid immediately after the fail event.
The lemmas are proved automatically by the Alloy Ana-
lyzer. Specifically, they are checked by exhaustive enumeration
over all possible networks with r ≤ 3 and n ≤ 9, where n
is the number of nodes (including ring members, appendage
members, and non-members).
There are three reasons for believing that this bounded
verification is sufficient to count as a proof:
• From Section V-B, a successor list that is disordered is
also a successor list that, interpreted as a path around
the ring, “wraps around” the ring. As the ring grows
larger, it becomes increasingly difficult for a successor
list built from interactions with neighbors to wrap around,
causing anomalies. In this argument “small” and “large”
are relative to r. The exhaustive enumeration covers cases
in which ring size is 3r.
• Ring structures have many symmetries. For example, it
has been proved by Emerson and Namjoshi that for all
properties of adjacent pairs of nodes, rings of size 4 are
sufficient to exhibit all counterexamples [27]. This is not
directly relevant because Chord’s properties are global
rather than pairwise, but it does indicate that anomalies
in rings occur when the rings are small.
• During the experience of model exploration with Alloy,
with r = 2, many new behaviors were found by in-
creasing the number of nodes from 5 to 6, and no new
behaviors were ever found by increasing the number of
nodes from 6 to 7. Also, no new behaviors were found
by increasing r from 2 to 3. This makes r = 3 and n = 9
seem like a safe limit.
It is also worth noting that Chord operations, when applied
to a network state that does not satisfy a sufficiently strong
invariant, produce an astonishing variety of weird counterex-
amples, which the Alloy Analyzer finds easily. Given the
predictable human propensity to see what we want to see,
Alloy analysis is far more credible than a manual proof of
invariance would be. The only proof that would be more
credible would be a formal proof for networks of any size,
checked by an automated theorem prover.
C. Guaranteeing progress
For each type of event that repairs the ring structure, there
is a predicate EffectiveEventTypeEnabled[n,t].
For a node n and state timestamped t,
EffectiveEventTypeEnabled[n,t] is true if and
only if at time t, an event of that type can occur at n, and if
it does occur it will change the state of n.
The definitions of these predicates must be checked for
correctness. For each predicate, this is done by proving a
lemma that if the predicate is true, the state is valid, and the
event occurs, then after the event the state of n is different.
The purpose of these definitions is to use the Al-
loy Analyzer to prove two crucial lemmas. The predicate
NetworkIsImprovable is true whenever some effective re-
pair event is enabled:
pred NetworkIsImprovable [t: Time] {
(some n: Node | EffectiveSFOSenabled [n, t])
|| (some n: Node | EffectiveSFNSenabled [n, t])
|| (some n, newPrdc: Node |
EffectiveRectifyEnabled [n, newPrdc, t] )
}
The predicate is used to assert that when the network is valid
and not ideal, it can be improved by an enabled repair event:
assert ValidNetworkIsImprovable {
all t: Time |
Valid[t] && ! Ideal[t]
=> NetworkIsImprovable[t]
}
We assume that if a repair event is enabled, it will eventually
be scheduled and executed. Furthermore, once a network has
become ideal, no executed repair event will change the state:
assert IdealNetworkIsNotImprovable {
all t: Time |
Valid[t] && Ideal[t]
=> ! NetworkIsImprovable[t]
}
Together these lemmas establish that whenever a network is in
a non-ideal state, an effective repair event will eventually be
executed and change the state. As with the invariant-preserving
lemmas, they are proved by exhaustive enumeration over all
possible networks with r ≤ 3 and n ≤ 9.
The final step is to show that a sequence of effective repair
events must eventually terminate by making the network ideal.
This step is informal. We define a measure of the error in a
Chord network, such that the measure of an ideal network is
0 and the measure of a non-ideal network is a positive integer.
We will also show that every effective repair event reduces the
measure. This will complete the proof that a network with no
new joins or fails will eventually become ideal.
Let s be the current size of the network (number of
members). This number is only changed by join and fail
operations, and not by any repair operations, so it remains
the same throughout a repair-only phase as hypothesized by
the theorem. The error of a pointer is defined as follows:
• The error of a predecessor or first successor is 0 if it
points to the globally correct member (in the sense of
identifier order), 1 if it points to the next-most-correct
member, . . . s−1 if it points to the least globally correct
member, s if there is no pointer (possible only for a
predecessor), and s+ 1 if it points to a non-member.
• The error of a second or later successor is 0 if its
node’s successor is live and the pointer matches the
corresponding pointer of its node’s successor’s successor
list. This holds regardless of whether the value of the
pointer is globally correct or not. The error of the second
or later successor is 1 otherwise.
The total error or just “error” of a network is defined as the
sum over all members and all pointers of the pointer error.
We now explain the effect of each repair event on
the network error. First, there are two cases of effective
StabilizeFromOldSuccessor events (see Section VII-A).
1) In one case, the member’s old successor was dead and
is replaced by a live successor. In this case the error
of the member’s first successor changes from s + 1 to
something less than s. The error of its second and later
successors changes from 1 to 0.
2) In the other case, the member’s old successor was live.
In this case the error of the member’s first successor
does not change, but the error of at least some of its
second and later successors changes from 1 to 0. Note
that if the stabilizing member is completely up-to-date
and no part of its successor list changes, then this is not
an effective event, and need not be considered.
An effective StabilizeFromNewSuccessor always re-
duces the error of the first successor. After the event the error
of all second and later successors is 0, so it may be decreased
and is not increased.
There are three cases of effective Rectify events (see
Section III).
1) In one case there was no previous predecessor, and the
error of the predecessor changes from s to something
less than s.
2) In another case, the previous predecessor was dead. In
this case the error of the predecessor changes from s+1
to something less than s.
3) In the third case, the previous predecessor was live. In
this case the error of the predecessor is always reduced.
In each case, for each event type, the error is reduced by the
event. 2
VIII. CONCLUSION
The basic design of the Chord ring-maintenance protocol is
extraordinary in its achievement of consistency with so little
overhead, so little synchronization, and such weak assumptions
of fairness.
Although refining the design and proving it correct was
difficult, modeling the original version of Chord and using
the Alloy Analyzer to check whether it satisfied its claims
was not difficult. Alloy and other similar tools such as model-
checkers have become mature in the years since Chord was
originally designed, and some such tool should be a part of
every protocol designer’s toolkit.
As practical consequences of this work, new implementers
of Chord should use the specifications in this paper. Nodes
that fail and restart can rejoin a Chord network immediately
on restart.
Previous implementers of Chord should check their im-
plementations of operations for bugs. They should introduce
procedures for better initialization, or at least global moni-
toring that the ring grows to a safe size without anomalies.
After this initial phase, only local checking of invariants on
extended successor lists is advisable for reliability and security.
Designers and implementers of other ring-shaped distributed
data structures should consider what their invariants are, how
they are related to Chord’s, and how they might be monitored.
On the theoretical side, the most interesting future work
would be to attempt to prove, with the same standard of
formality, the correctness of enhancements such as protection
against malicious peers [8], [9], [10], key consistency and
data consistency [11], range queries [12], and atomic access
to replicated data [13], [14]. Although some of these enhance-
ments use probabilistic reasoning more heavily, probabilistic
model-checking and verification are now coming into their
own.
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APPENDIX A: INVESTIGATION OF TRIAL INVARIANTS
Section V-B explained that a member skips another member
if the skipping member’s extended successor list does not
mention the skipped member, yet the skipped member fits
between a pair that is in the list. The intuition is that the
skipped member is too new to be known to the skipping
member. Based on this intuition, we can define a predicate
MustPreDate(n1,n2) that is true if and only if n1 and n2 are
63
47
35
18
63 stabilizes,
NoConflictingDates
violated
50 fails,
NoConflictingDates
violated
50
38
11
17
8
Fig. 5. Two counterexamples to a trial inductive invariant. Second successors not drawn are correct, i.e., they are the successors of the nodes’ successors.
ring members, and there is a third ring member n3 (possibly
the same as n1) that mentions n1 and skips n2.
One of the most promising candidate conjuncts for the
inductive invariant was NoConflictingDates, which says that
there is no pair (n1,n2) such that MustPreDate(n1,n2) and
MustPreDate(n2,n1).
NoConflictingDates is closely related to another candidate
conjunct, NoEjects. NoEjects simply says that a member in the
ring has no successor in its list that points to an appendage.
For example, in Figure 4, ring member 52 has eject 45.
The two are related in the sense that violations of each can
cause violations of the other. First, consider an arc of a ring
(v, w, x, y, z) where v skips x because its second successor is
y, and w skips y because its second successor is z. Note that
this violates NoConflictingDates: Because v skips x, all of v,
w, and y must pre-date x. Because w skips y, all of w, x, and z
must pre-date y. Now if x fails, then the arc of best successors
becomes (v, w, z), with y as an appendage connected to the
ring at z. Now the second successor of v is an eject, pointing
outside the ring to y.
Figure 4 is an example that goes in the other direction. It
begins with a violation of NoEjects, and ends with a violation
of NoConflictingDates (45 pre-dates 52 and 52 pre-dates 45).
This raises the enticing possibility that the four original
conjuncts, plus NoDuplicates, OrderedSuccessorLists, NoCon-
flictingDates, and NoEjects, might make an inductive invariant.
Unfortunately it is not, and Figure 5 shows two separate
counterexamples with r = 2. Both sides of the figure satisfy
the proposed invariant. Yet if 63 stabilizes on the left side, No-
ConflictingDates is violated (18 pre-dates 47 and 47 pre-dates
18). Also, if 50 fails on the right side, NoConflictingDates is
violated (each pair in 11, 17, and 38 has a date conflict).
At this stage of the investigation there are two possibilities:
• The proposed invariant is simply not an invariant. It is
worth noting that the inductive invariant with BaseNot-
Skipped does not imply either NoConflictingDates or
NoEjects, although it does imply NoDuplicates and Or-
deredSuccessorLists.
• The proposed invariant is a true invariant of Chord,
and the networks in Figure 5 are false counterexamples
because they could never occur during Chord operation.
They do look weird! If so, however, the proposed invari-
ant is not inductive. To make it inductive we must add
other as-yet-unknown conjuncts to exclude the networks
in the figure.
There is no way to know which possibility is the true one, and
either way we are no closer to a final inductive invariant.
It may seem that it would be easy to add conjuncts to
exclude the networks in Figure 5, but looks are deceiving.
Every conjunct that makes the problem easier by excluding
more pre-operation states also makes the problem harder by
excluding more post-operation states and thus generating new
counterexamples. The process does not converge. For those
who would like to experiment on their own, http://www2.
research.att.com/∼pamela/chordnobase.als is a model of Chord
without a stable base that can be used conveniently for this
purpose.
To explore in a different direction, it would be satisfying to
achieve certainty on the feasibility of the networks in Figure 5
by using a model-checker to generate the entire reachable state
space of a Chord network with r = 2, for some n > 5. (A
network might be reachable with the past participation of other
nodes that are no longer members, hence the need for more
nodes.) This has been attempted with the model-checker Spin
[28], but the analysis is too computationally complex. Even
analysis of a simpler Chord model with restricted concurrency
did not reach the entire state space with n = 5 [26].
